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ARTICLES
ARBITRATION PROVISIONS: LITTLE DARLINGS
AND LITTLE MONSTERS
Stephen Friedman*
This Article takes a new approach to resolving the growing tension
between the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and the unconscionability
doctrine. While arbitration provisions are favored under the FAA, they are
viewed far more skeptically by courts applying unconscionability to refuse
enforcement of one-sided arbitration provisions. This tension, which has
increased dramatically in recent years, represents a major fault line in
contract law. Jurisprudence and commentary on this issue have assumed
that courts have the authority to apply the unconscionability doctrine to
arbitration provisions. This Article refutes that assumption, taking the
position that Congress, in passing the FAA, removed from the courts the
power to use unconscionability to deny enforcement of arbitration
provisions. This argument is based on the language and structure of the
FAA, the FAA’s legislative history, commentary contemporaneous with the
passage of the FAA, and the nature of unconscionability. To the extent it is
necessary to protect vulnerable parties from one-sided arbitration
provisions, judicial application of the unconscionability doctrine cannot be
the solution. This Article suggests that the arbitration system itself may be
capable of addressing any such overreaching.
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INTRODUCTION
In the eyes of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 1 arbitration provisions
are “little darlings”—favored contract terms presumptively entitled to full
enforcement. To courts applying the unconscionability doctrine, however,
such provisions are often viewed as “little monsters.” Three developments
have brought the FAA’s pro-arbitration policy into conflict with
unconscionability’s more skeptical outlook. First, the United States
Supreme Court has steadily expanded the scope of the FAA.2 Second,
arbitration provisions have become increasingly common in employment
and consumer contracts.3 And, third, parties with stronger bargaining
power have become more brazen about drafting arbitration provisions to
favor their own interests. 4 The Supreme Court recently had an opportunity
to resolve the conflict, 5 but left things only slightly less confused than
before. 6
Jurisprudence and commentary to date have assumed that courts have the
authority to use the unconscionability doctrine to refuse to enforce onesided arbitration provisions. This Article challenges that assumption and
takes the position that Congress, in passing the FAA, intended to strip
courts of that power. This Article puts forward a number of arguments to
support the position that courts should not use unconscionability as a tool to
assess arbitration provisions. First, in passing the FAA, Congress made a
meta-determination that arbitration agreements, as a class, are beyond
judicial skepticism. They are, at least as far as the courts should be
concerned, “pre-approved.” Thus, even a badly one-sided arbitration
provision should not, to use a typical formulation of unconscionability,
“shock the conscience” 7 of a court (or if it does, the court must not be so

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006).
See infra notes 30–34 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 62–63 and accompanying text.
See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
See Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010).
See discussion infra Part I.C.2.
See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
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darn sensitive). The legislative history and commentary contemporaneous
with the passage of the legislation establish this point.
Second, the structure of the FAA demonstrates that Congress intended to
remove discretionary doctrines, such as unconscionability, from the tools
available to courts to police arbitration provisions. The FAA simply does
not contemplate an unconscionability analysis; to the contrary, the structure
of the FAA excludes it, replacing it with only a limited review after the
arbitrators’ award.
Third, while the Supreme Court has indicated that the triumvirate of
fraud, duress, and unconscionability are state law doctrines of general
applicability that can be applied to arbitration provisions without running
afoul of the FAA, 8 this Article takes the position that because
unconscionability is, in key relevant ways, different from fraud and duress,
courts should not apply unconscionability to arbitration provisions. For
instance, while fraud and duress go to the “making of the arbitration
agreement” 9 (and hence are within the scope of matters to be addressed by a
court), unconscionability goes to “what the arbitration agreement is made
of,” a question that is properly addressed by the arbitrator.
Concluding that courts should not apply unconscionability to arbitration
provisions does not constitute a dismissal of the importance of the
unconscionability doctrine in general. While the FAA may suspend the
ability of courts to apply unconscionability in this context, the doctrine still
remains the law and there is no impediment to arbitrators applying the
doctrine. This leads to one final question: can we trust the arbitrators with
this job? The most accurate answer is probably “we’ll see,” but there are at
least some hopeful signs.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides an overview of the
FAA, the unconscionability doctrine, and, most importantly, the interaction
between them. Part II puts forward several arguments that support the
proposition that unconscionability should not be used by courts to assess
arbitration provisions. Finally, Part III addresses the question of whether, if
we put courts out of the unconscionability business, arbitrators are up to the
task of policing arbitration provisions.
I. BRIEF BACKGROUND ON THE FAA AND THE UNCONSCIONABILITY
DOCTRINE
A. The FAA
The Supreme Court often seems torn when it comes to how courts should
treat arbitration provisions compared to how they treat other types of
contract provisions. Consider the following statement: “[s]ection 2 [of the
FAA] embodies the national policy favoring arbitration and places

8. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. at 2776; Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686
(1996).
9. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006).
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arbitration agreements on equal footing with all other contracts.” 10 On the
one hand, the Court seems to be saying that arbitration provisions are to be
treated just like other contract provisions (that is, no better and no worse).
But if that is the case, how is there a federal policy “favoring” arbitration,
since “to favor” implies giving one thing preferential treatment over
another? There cannot be both equality and favoritism. The current status
of arbitration provisions is probably akin to that of the pigs in George
Orwell’s Animal Farm—all contract provisions are equal, but some (like
arbitration provisions) are more equal than others.11 A quick review of the
FAA shows how we got to this point.
In 1925 Congress passed the United States Arbitration Act, 12 as the FAA
was originally titled, to overcome prior judicial hostility towards predispute arbitration agreements. 13 That judicial hostility was reflected in
common law rules that rendered pre-dispute arbitration provisions of little
use. Under those common law rules, courts permitted either party to a predispute arbitration agreement to revoke the agreement at any time before
the entry of an award. 14 Further, although arbitration agreements were
deemed technically valid, courts typically refrained from enforcing them in
equity, refusing to stay litigation or order the parties to proceed to
arbitration. 15
Dissatisfaction with these common law rules (often referred to
collectively as the “rule of revocability” 16), mostly in commercial circles,
led to a strong movement to undo such rules legislatively. Efforts, initially
led by the New York State Chamber of Commerce, resulted in the passage
of the New York Arbitration Law in 1920. 17 The New York Arbitration
Law reversed the judicial hostility towards arbitration provisions,
mandating that a “provision in a written contract to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising between the parties . . . shall be valid,
enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in

10. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006).
11. GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 149 (Harcourt Brace & Co. 1995) (1945) (“All
animals are equal but some animals are more equal than others.”).
12. ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16).
13. See H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1–2 (1924) (noting that the “need for the law arises from
an anachronism of our American law” reflecting a judicial hostility towards arbitration
agreements); S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 2–3 (1924) (describing the judicial hostility that the
United States Arbitration Act was intended to correct).
14. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 32 (1984) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting).
15. See S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 2 (“[I]t is very old law that the performance of a written
agreement to arbitrate would not be enforced in equity, and that if an action at law were
brought on the contract containing the agreement to arbitrate, such agreement could not be
pleaded in bar of the action.”).
16. WESLEY A. STURGES, A TREATISE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATIONS AND AWARDS 45
(1930).
17. Julius Henry Cohen, The Law of Commercial Arbitration and the New York Statute,
31 YALE L.J. 147, 147–48 (1921) (describing efforts leading up to passage of the New York
Arbitration Law).
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equity for the revocation of any contract.” 18 The New York Arbitration
Law thus “abrogate[d] an ancient rule” 19—the rule of revocability.
Federal legislation modeled on the New York Arbitration Law followed
within a few years. The FAA, like the New York Arbitration Law, was
passed to reverse legislatively the judicial rule of revocability 20 and to
“replace judicial indisposition to arbitration with a ‘national policy favoring
[it].’” 21 Accordingly, the FAA “declares simply that . . . agreements for
arbitration shall be enforced, and provides a procedure . . . for their
enforcement.” 22
Section 2 of the FAA (section 2), the FAA’s “centerpiece provision,”23
states that a “written provision in any . . . contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising
out of such contract . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.” 24 The FAA also provides a mechanism for the specific
enforcement by courts of arbitration provisions. Section 3 of the FAA
(section 3) empowers (actually, it requires) a court to stay litigation when a
lawsuit has been brought over an issue covered by a valid arbitration
agreement. 25 And section 4 of the FAA (section 4) requires a court, once
satisfied that an arbitration agreement has been made and that one of the
parties has refused to arbitrate, to order the parties to proceed to arbitration
in accordance with the terms of the agreement. 26 The FAA provides
limited grounds for vacating 27 or modifying 28 the award of the arbitrators. 29
The FAA’s importance has been magnified by the fact that the Supreme
Court has greatly expanded the scope of the FAA. For instance, the Court
has held that Congress intended the FAA to extend to the full limit of
Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause.30 The Court has also
held that the FAA applies in state as well as federal courts, 31 that the FAA
18. Act of Apr. 19, 1920, ch. 275, 1920 N.Y. Laws 803, reprinted in part in STURGES,
supra note 16, at 92 (current version codified as amended at N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 7501–14
(MCKINNEY 2011)).
19. Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., 130 N.E. 288, 289 (N.Y. 1921).
20. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
21. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1402 (2008) (quoting
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006)).
22. H.R. REP. NO. 68–96, at 2 (1924).
23. Vaden v. Discover Bank, 129 S. Ct. 1262, 1274 (2009) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 (1985)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
24. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
25. Id. § 3.
26. Id. § 4.
27. Id. § 10.
28. Id. § 11.
29. I discuss this point more fully later in the Article. See infra notes 175–87 and
accompanying text.
30. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273–74 (1995); see also
Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 55 (2003) (rejecting requirement that activity
must have a “substantial effect on interstate commerce” to be covered by the FAA).
31. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1984).
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applies to employment contracts 32 (despite some ambiguous language in the
statute 33), and that, with some possible exceptions, the FAA applies to
agreements to arbitrate statutory claims. 34
The Court has also reduced the applicability of state law to arbitration
provisions, and the scope of this reduction is crucial to understanding the
role of unconscionability in the policing of arbitration provisions. Section 2
does carve out a role for state law, providing for the enforceability of
written arbitration provisions “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract.” 35 The Court has made clear that
state law may be applied “if that law arose to govern issues concerning the
validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally.” 36 The
Court has even gone so far as to twice identify unconscionability as one of
the grounds referred to in section 2.37
On the other hand, the Court has also stated:
What States may not do is decide that a contract is fair enough to enforce
all its basic terms (price, service, credit), but not fair enough to enforce its
arbitration clause. The Act makes any such state policy unlawful, for that
kind of policy would place arbitration clauses on an unequal “footing,”
directly contrary to the Act’s language and Congress’ intent. 38

This language seems to say that while a contract containing an arbitration
clause can be unenforceable, the arbitration provision itself cannot be
considered as part of that judicial determination.
These seemingly conflicting statements from the Court have left the
status and role of unconscionability unsettled. I return to this point below
when I discuss the encounter between unconscionability and the FAA over
the proper regulation of arbitration provisions. 39 But first I provide an
overview of the doctrine of unconscionability.
B. Unconscionability
The Supreme Court had an opportunity to clarify the relationship
between unconscionability, arbitration provisions, and the FAA in the
recent case Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 40 an opinion I will address
in more detail shortly. During oral argument Justice Breyer asked one of
the attorneys the following crucial questions: “What is the underlying
rationale in contract law of setting aside contracts as unconscionable? Why
32. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001).
33. The statute excludes from its coverage “contracts of employment of seamen, railroad
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in . . . interstate commerce.” 9 U.S.C. § 1.
34. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (“It is by now
clear that statutory claims may be the subject of an arbitration agreement, enforceable
pursuant to the FAA.”).
35. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
36. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686–87 (1996) (quoting Perry v.
Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987)).
37. See infra notes 79–91 and accompanying text.
38. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995).
39. See discussion infra Part I.C.2.
40. 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010).
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do courts do it? What’s the theory? I would like to know that.” 41 In this
section of the Article I attempt to provide a very brief response to the
questions posed by Justice Breyer.
Most law-trained readers are quite familiar with modern
unconscionability as articulated in the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.)
and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (Restatement). Section 2-302 of
the U.C.C. provides:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court
may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the
contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the
application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable
result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any
clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a
reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting,
purpose and effect to aid the court in making the determination. 42

The common law formulation, as articulated in Restatement section 208, is
based on 43 and nearly identical to section 2-302(1) of the U.C.C., providing
that:
If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is
made a court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the
remainder of the contract without the unconscionable term, or may so
limit the application of any unconscionable term as to avoid any
unconscionable result. 44

Neither the U.C.C. nor the Restatement defines unconscionability, but
most courts continue to require a showing of both procedural
unconscionability (which goes to the manner in which the bargain was
formed) and substantive unconscionability (which goes to the one-sidedness
of the contract terms involved).45 However, many courts take other
approaches, such as requiring only substantive unconscionability. 46 Even
among courts that do adhere to the procedural/substantive unconscionability

41. Transcript of Oral Argument at 49, Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct.
2772 (2010) (No. 09-497), 2010 WL 1654083 at *48.
42. U.C.C. § 2-302 (2002).
43. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208, reporter’s note (1981) (noting
that the description of unconscionability follows U.C.C. § 2-302).
44. Id. § 208.
45. See JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 96(B)(2)(b) (4th ed.
2001).
46. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Fid. Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 59–60 (Ariz. 1995)
(indicating substantive unconscionability alone may be sufficient for a finding of
unconscionability); Ahern v. Knecht, 563 N.E.2d 787, 792 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (gross
excessiveness of price alone is sufficient for unconscionability); Brower v. Gateway 2000,
Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 574–75 (App. Div. 1998) (indicating substantive unconscionability
alone may be sufficient for a finding of unconscionability); cf. March v. Tysinger Motor Co.,
No. 3:07-CV-508, 2007 WL 4358339, at *4 n.5 (E.D. Va. Dec. 12, 2007) (noting that
Virginia law on unconscionability does not include the procedural/substantive dichotomy).
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requirement, there is a difference of opinion as to whether the mere use of a
contract of adhesion gives rise, by itself, to procedural unconscionability. 47
Beyond the basic framework, things become even more unsettled.
Because unconscionability is not defined, it has been described as
“amorphous” 48 and “chameleon-like.” 49 A few formulations seem to recur.
For instance, courts frequently describe unconscionability as existing in the
case of contracts that “no man in his senses and not under delusion would
make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the
other.” 50 Other courts have described unconscionable contracts or terms as
being those that “shock the conscience.” 51 Another standard provides that
unconscionability involves a finding of “an absence of meaningful choice”
coupled with contract terms that are “unreasonably favorable” to the
stronger party. 52
Of course, U.C.C. section 2-302 was drafted after the passage of the
FAA. But the doctrine of unconscionability was well established by the

47. Compare Clerk v. First Bank of Del., No. 09-5121, 2010 WL 1253578, at *9 (E.D.
Pa. Mar. 22, 2010) (“Procedural unconscionability is generally found where the agreement is
a contract of adhesion.”), and Flores v. Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376,
382 (Ct. App. 2001) (stating that “[a] finding of a contract of adhesion is essentially a
finding of procedural unconscionability”), with Bhim v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 655 F. Supp.
2d 1307, 1313 n.3 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (indicating mere fact that a contract is an “adhesion
contract” is not by itself sufficient to establish procedural unconscionability under Florida
law).
48. See, e.g., Farmers Auto. Ins. Ass’n v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 2008 WI App 116, ¶ 32,
313 Wis. 2d 93, 756 N.W.2d 461.
49. Steinhardt v. Rudolph, 422 So. 2d 884, 890 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
50. This is the formulation used in a leading mid-eighteenth century English case on
unconscionability, Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, (1750) 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100(Ch.); 2 Ves.
Sen. 125, 155. This formulation, or variations on it, is still quite common. See, e.g., Am.
Bottling Co. v. Crescent/Mach I Partners, L.P., No. 09C-02-134 WCC, 2009 WL 3290729,
at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 30, 2009) (noting that in Delaware the traditional test for
unconscionability is whether a contract is “‘such as no man in his senses and not under
delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest or fair man would accept, on the
other’” (quoting Tulowitzki v. Atl. Richfield Co., 396 A.2d 956, 960 (Del. 1978))); Stream
v. Grow, No. 09-1011, 2010 WL 1578233, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2010) (an
agreement is unconscionable if it is “‘such as no man in his senses and not under delusion
would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the other’”
(quoting Casey v. Lupkes, 286 N.W.2d 204, 207 (Iowa 1979))); Cioffi-Petrakis v. Petrakis,
898 N.Y.S.2d 861, 861 (App. Div. 2010) (“‘An unconscionable bargain is one which no
person in his or her senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and no
honest and fair person would accept on the other, the inequality being so strong and manifest
as to shock the conscience . . . .’” (quoting Morad v. Morad, 812 N.Y.S.2d 126, 127 (App.
Div. 2006))).
51. See, e.g., Harrington v. Atl. Sounding Co., 602 F.3d 113, 125 (2d Cir. 2010)
(substantive unconscionability exists only if the agreement “shocks the court’s conscience”);
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Mantor, 335 F.3d 1101, 1107 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that
substantive unconscionability requires that an agreement’s terms are “so one-sided as to
shock the conscience”); Oesterle v. Atria Mgmt. Co., No. 09-4010-JAR, 2009 WL 2043492,
at *3 (D. Kan. July 14, 2009) (unconscionability requires that a court find the contract
provision at issue so outrageous and unfair as to “shock[] the conscience”).
52. This standard was articulated in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d
445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965), and has been described by a leading treatise as a “durable”
standard. E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.28, at 301 (4th ed. 2004).
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time of the passage of the FAA 53 and Congress would surely have been
aware of this doctrine at the time.
So, what is the response to Justice Breyer’s inquiry as to the “underlying
rationale” of unconscionability and why courts refuse to fully enforce
unconscionable contracts? In my view, there are two fundamental
rationales: (1) the protection of parties with weak bargaining power from
contractual overreaching by those with stronger bargaining power, and (2)
the preservation of judicial integrity. With respect to this latter point, I
mean that courts do not want to serve as tools of injustice and will not lend
their active assistance, by way of full enforcement, to those who seek to
take advantage of others through the imposition of overreaching contracts.
The first rationale—protection of weaker parties—is fairly evident.
Modern unconscionability is designed to protect contracting parties from
“oppression and unfair surprise.” 54 This solicitude is at its greatest when it
comes to parties with weak bargaining power: “gross inequality of
bargaining power, together with terms unreasonably favorable to the
stronger party, may confirm indications that the transaction involved
elements of deception or compulsion, or may show that the weaker party
had no meaningful choice . . . .” 55
Important though this rationale is, unconscionability has also long been a
doctrine of preserving judicial integrity and ensuring that courts not
participate in perpetrating injustice. As one court observed in a leading
case on unconscionability:
[A] party who has offered and succeeded in getting an agreement as tough
as [the one before the court] is, should not come to a chancellor and ask
court help in the enforcement of its terms. That equity does not enforce
unconscionable bargains is too well established to require elaborate
citation. 56

The court noted that although the contract before it was not illegal and
could be enforced, specific enforcement would not be granted because “the
sum total of [the contract’s] provisions drives too hard a bargain for a court
of conscience to assist.” 57 Similarly, Justice Frankfurter, in a dissent to a
1942 Supreme Court opinion, described the “basic doctrine that the courts
will not permit themselves to be used as instruments of inequity and
injustice” as firmly embedded in the law.58
53. See, e.g., Scott v. United States, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 443, 445 (1870) (noting that “[i]f
a contract be unreasonable and unconscionable, but not void for fraud, a court of law will
give to the party who sues for its breach damages, not according to its letter, but only such as
he is equitably entitled to”). I have previously argued that unconscionability had become
well established in the United States by the end of the nineteenth century. See Stephen E.
Friedman, Giving Unconscionability More Muscle: Attorney’s Fees as a Remedy for
Contractual Overreaching, 44 GA. L. REV. 317, 339–40 (2010).
54. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (2002).
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. d (1981).
56. Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80, 83 (3d Cir. 1948).
57. Id. at 84.
58. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 326 (1942) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
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While unconscionability largely developed as an equitable doctrine, it
also has deep roots in law59 and there, too, unconscionability was largely
about judicial discretion and integrity. Unconscionability manifested itself
in law as a doctrine that permitted a court to adjust the extent to which it
would enforce a contract. As the Supreme Court noted in 1870, “If a
contract be unreasonable and unconscionable . . . a court of law will give to
the party who sues for its breach damages, not according to its letter, but
only such as he is equitably entitled to.” 60 Similarly, in an 1872 opinion, a
New York state court refused to fully enforce a contract to write an
autobiography because the award sought struck the court as “so monstrous
and extravagant that it would be a reproach to the administration of justice
to countenance or uphold it.” 61
Having established a preliminary answer to Justice Breyer’s questions by
saying that two rationales—the protection of vulnerable parties and the
protection of the courts—underlie unconscionability, we can turn more
specifically to the relationship between unconscionability and the FAA
when it comes to arbitration provisions.
C. The FAA and Unconscionability: The Twain Meet
1. Initial Encounters
Since the 1980s we have seen the “expansion of arbitration into the realm
of standardized consumer and employment contracts.” 62 As arbitration
provisions moved from their traditional role in commercial transactions and
labor-management transactions into other types of transactions, such as
consumer transactions, 63 arbitration provisions began playing more and
more on unconscionability’s turf.
Additionally, parties began drafting arbitration agreements in ways that
struck some courts as overreaching. Instead of “plain vanilla” arbitration
provisions that might simply refer all disputes to arbitration under the rules
of a provider of arbitration services (such as the American Arbitration
59. JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 9.38, at 382 (5th ed.
2003).
60. Scott v. United States, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 443, 445 (1870).
61. Greer v. Tweed, 13 Abb. Pr. (n.s.) 427, 429 (N.Y. Ct. Com. Pl. 1872).
62. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation,” 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1,
37; see also Wylie Indep. Sch. Dist. v. TMC Founds., Inc., 770 S.W.2d 19, 23–24 (Tex.
App. 1989) (Howell, J., dissenting) (noting a continuing trend towards the use of arbitration
provisions in various types of agreements, including employment agreements, insurance
agreements, and contracts for the sale of consumers goods, and predicting an acceleration of
this proliferation).
63. See generally Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” To Arbitrate
Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, 67 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 55–56 (2004) (noting that over the past few decades there has been a
shift from arbitration provisions being used primarily in commercial transactions and labormanagement transactions to arbitration provisions being used in consumer transactions, as
well); Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages and the Consumerization of Arbitration,
92 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 6–8 (1997) (discussing widespread use of arbitration in consumer and
employment contracts following series of expansive Supreme Court decisions in the 1980s).
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Association), carefully tailored arbitration provisions began appearing.
Arbitration provisions were drafted that limited the type or amount of
damages an arbitrator could award (including limits on the award of
punitive damages), prohibited class-wide arbitration, required employees or
consumers to arbitrate their claims but permitted the drafting party to sue in
court, failed to assure a neutral arbitrator, imposed cost allocations that
might discourage the bringing of claims, and called for arbitration in a
forum inconvenient for the consumer or employee. 64
Unconscionability was brought to bear on these aspects of arbitration
provisions as part of a large upswing in the use of unconscionability to
police arbitration agreements beginning in the 1990s. 65 Professor Charles
Knapp surveyed reported case law on unconscionability from 1990 through
2008. He observed a dramatic increase in the number of annual claims of
unconscionability as a defense to enforcement of an arbitration provision—
“from 1 or 2 at most through 1996, up to an average of 38 from the years
2003 through 2007, and to 115 in 2008.” 66
The results of this increased use of unconscionability are not always
clear, and arbitration provisions may be treated very differently depending
on what court is assessing them. As one article noted in comparing Georgia
and California law, “[m]any jurisdictions, including Georgia, [are] . . .
reluctant to invalidate arbitration agreements on unconscionability grounds”
while in California “a parallel body of unconscionability jurisprudence” has
resulted in “hundreds of California cases [that] expand and justify the use of
unconscionability to strike down arbitration provisions.” 67 Class action
waivers in arbitration provisions provide one useful illustration of the mess
that is current unconscionability doctrine. Some courts have found
limitations on a consumer’s right to proceed as part of a class to be
substantively unconscionable, 68 while others have found it to be not
substantively unconscionable.69 California courts, for their part, have
64. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and
the Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1437–39 (2008)
(describing various aspects of arbitration provisions that courts have focused on as
potentially problematic).
65. Id. at 1439–41 (quantifying increased use of unconscionability defenses directed
towards arbitration provisions); see also Steven J. Burton, The New Judicial Hostility to
Arbitration: Federal Preemption, Contract Unconscionability, and Agreements To
Arbitrate, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 469, 492–500 (collecting cases applying unconscionability
doctrine to various aspects of arbitration provisions); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration,
Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The Return of Unconscionability Analysis as a
Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 757, 799–812
(2004) (discussing the increased use of unconscionability to police arbitration agreements).
66. Charles L. Knapp, Blowing the Whistle on Mandatory Arbitration:
Unconscionability as a Signaling Device, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 609, 622 (2009).
67. Ryan M. Turley, Only the Rich Can Afford a Remedy: The Unconscionable
Enforcement of Arbitration Provisions Against the Indigent, 2007 J. DISP. RESOL. 611, 614–
15.
68. See, e.g., Cottonwood Fin., Ltd. v. Estes, 2010 WI App 75, ¶ 1, 325 Wis. 2d 749,
784 N.W.2d 726.
69. See, e.g., La Torre v. BFS Retail & Commercial Operations, LLC, No. 08-22046CIV, 2008 WL 5156301, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 8, 2008).

2046

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

developed a three-part test for determining when a waiver by a consumer of
the right to proceed in a class is unconscionable. 70 Arbitration law has thus
become something of a patchwork—hardly a desirable result in a federal
statute that articulates a national policy. 71
Some commentators have cheered the increasing use of
unconscionability to assess arbitration provisions,72 while others have
criticized it as a return to the judicial hostility that the FAA was designed to
eliminate. 73 This Article seeks to add to that debate by questioning the very
premise that courts have the authority to assess the unconscionability of
arbitration provisions.
2. The Supreme Court on Arbitration and Unconscionability
The Supreme Court has sent mixed signals when it comes to arbitration
provisions and unconscionability. The Court noted in Allied-Bruce
Terminix Cos. v. Dobson 74 that “[s]tates may regulate contracts, including
arbitration clauses, under general contract law principles.” 75 But the Court
went on to note:
What States may not do is decide that a contract is fair enough to enforce
all its basic terms (price, service, credit), but not fair enough to enforce its
arbitration clause. The [FAA] makes any such state policy unlawful, for
that kind of policy would place arbitration clauses on an unequal
“footing,” directly contrary to the [FAA’s] language and Congress’
intent. 76

The above language, while not directly referring to unconscionability,
provides guidance in understanding the role that unconscionability can (and
cannot) play in the policing of arbitration provisions. Taken literally, the
language in Allied-Bruce would seem to say that while a contract containing
an arbitration provision can be deemed unenforceable, the arbitration
provision itself cannot be a factor in making that determination.
The relationship between unconscionability and arbitration was
mentioned, though in dicta, in Perry v. Thomas. 77 In that case the Court
declined to consider a claim that an arbitration provision was
unconscionable but noted that the lower court was free to consider the
matter on remand. The Court gave some guidance to the lower court:

70. See Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005).
71. See, e.g., Fit Tech Inc. v. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp., 374 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.
2004) (noting it is obvious that a uniform federal definition of the word “arbitration” is
required).
72. See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 65, at 808 (arguing that the “advent of renewed
unconscionability-based scrutiny of arbitration clauses is on the whole a positive trend”).
73. See infra notes 128–36 and accompanying text.
74. 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
75. Id. at 281.
76. Id.
77. 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987) (citing Southland Corp v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 n.11
(1984); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967)).
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[Under section 2], state law, whether of legislative or judicial origin, is
applicable if that law arose to govern issues concerning the validity,
revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally. A state-law
principle that takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to
arbitrate is at issue does not comport with this requirement of [section] 2.
A court may not, then, in assessing the rights of litigants to enforce an
arbitration agreement, construe that agreement in a manner different from
that in which it otherwise construes nonarbitration agreements under state
law. Nor may a court rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate
as a basis for a state-law holding that enforcement would be
unconscionable, for this would enable the court to effect what we hold
today the state legislature cannot. 78

Perry left for the lower court the determination of whether
unconscionability as directed against an arbitration provision is a law that
governs contracts generally. Further, while the Court indicated that the
“uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate” cannot be the basis of a
determination of unconscionability, it left open what is included within the
scope of that uniqueness. At the very least, Perry would seem to put some
aspects of arbitration beyond the range of unconscionability.
The Court discussed, albeit briefly and in dicta, the relationship between
unconscionability and the FAA in Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto.79
The Court in Casarotto held that a Montana statute that required arbitration
provisions to be in underlined capital letters on the first page of a contract
was preempted by the FAA because the Montana statute impermissibly
singled out arbitration provisions for suspect status.80 Although a Montana
statute (and not unconscionability) was at issue in Casarotto, the Court
indicated in dicta that unconscionability is applicable to arbitration
provisions covered by the FAA. The Court gave three examples of
generally
applicable
contract
defenses—“fraud,
duress,
or
unconscionability”—each of which the Court said “may be applied to
invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening [section] 2.”81
The recent opinion of Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson 82 provides the
Court’s most significant discussion of the relationship between
unconscionability and the FAA. The key issue before the Court in Jackson
was whether the court or the arbitrators should decide the unconscionability
of an arbitration provision. The arbitration agreement at issue in Jackson
provided in relevant part that the “Arbitrator, and not any federal, state, or
local court or agency, shall have exclusive authority to resolve any dispute
relating to the interpretation, applicability, enforceability or formation of
this Agreement including, but not limited to any claim that all or any part of
this Agreement is void or voidable.” 83

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
517 U.S. 681 (1996).
Id. at 683, 686–87.
Id. at 687.
130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010).
Id. at 2775.
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An earlier opinion had established two key guiding principles (though
not with respect to unconscionability in particular) that the Jackson Court
applied. In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.,84
the Court had held that a claim for fraud in the inducement of an entire
contract (as opposed to a claim directed against the arbitration provision in
particular) was generally for the arbitrator, not the court, to decide.85 In
reaching that decision the Court held that, as a matter of federal substantive
law, an arbitration provision is separable from the contract in which it is
embedded. 86 Further, the Court in Prima Paint held that a challenge to the
contract as a whole is to be addressed by the arbitrator. Only if a challenge
is to the arbitration provision itself is the court to consider the matter.87
The reason for the rule of severability, the Court explained in Jackson, is
that section 2 makes written provisions “valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable” without any mention that the contract in which it is included
must also be valid. 88
The Court in Jackson made clear that the fact that an arbitration provision
is severable does not make it “unassailable” 89 and that one of the bases on
which an arbitration provision could be assailed is unconscionability. The
Court noted, as it had in Casarotto, that “[l]ike other contracts . . .
[arbitration provisions] may be invalidated by ‘generally applicable contract
defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.’” 90 The Court noted
as well that the “validity of a written agreement to arbitrate ( . . . including,
of course whether it was void for unconscionability) is governed by
[section] 2’s provision that it shall be valid ‘save upon such grounds as exist
at law or equity for the revocation of any contract.’” 91
The Court in Jackson held that the challenge at issue was to the validity
of the contract as a whole (even though the “whole” contract was an
arbitration agreement without any other provisions) and thus was properly
directed to the arbitrator and not the court. Only a challenge to the specific
aspect of the arbitration agreement at issue—the granting of authority to the
arbitrator to decide questions of validity—would have been for the court. 92
The Court thus pushed the concept of severability quite hard. The dissent
observed that the severability rule established by Prima Paint permits a
court “to pluck from a potentially invalid contract a potentially valid
arbitration agreement.” 93 The dissent then criticized the majority for
extending that rule to an extreme: “Today the Court adds a new layer of
severability—something akin to Russian nesting dolls—into the mix:
Courts may now pluck from a potentially invalid arbitration agreement
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

388 U.S. 395 (1967).
Id. at 404.
Id. at 402–04.
Id. at 403–04.
130 S. Ct. at 2776 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)).
Id. at 2778.
Id. at 2776 (quoting Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)).
Id. at 2777 n.1 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2).
Id. at 2778.
Id. at 2786 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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even narrower provisions that refer particular arbitrability disputes to an
arbitrator.” 94
Because the Court held that the challenge was to the agreement as a
whole and hence for the arbitrator, the Court did not fully resolve the
question of how an unconscionability analysis would fit into the judicial
procedures of the statute. The Court seemed to assume that such a
challenge would be decided under the procedures for a stay of litigation and
an order to compel arbitration set forth in sections 3 and 4, respectively.
The Court noted, for instance, that sections 3 and 4 are designed to
implement section 2’s substantive rule. 95 In somewhat ambiguous
language, the Court stated that if a party challenges the validity of an
arbitration agreement under section 2, “the federal court must consider the
challenge before ordering compliance with that agreement under [section]
4.” 96 It is difficult to know whether this dicta indicates that the
consideration of the challenge is carried out under the rubric of section 4 or
whether the consideration is somehow separate from section 4 (i.e., must
come “before” the analysis under section 4 in some procedure not explicitly
set out in the FAA).
The Court did characterize unconscionability as a “gateway” issue, and
this characterization gives some indication of how unconscionability is to
be treated. Gateway issues, “such as whether the parties have agreed to
arbitrate or whether their agreement covers a particular controversy,” 97 are
the types of issues that parties would likely have expected a court to decide.
By placing unconscionability alongside issues of contract formation, which
are to be determined under section 4, the Court indicated that
unconscionability should be decided by a like procedure.98
It was with this last point that the Court, in my view, went somewhat
astray. The bottom line result of Jackson will be the removal from the
courts of many determinations of the unconscionability of arbitration
provisions. Assuming a sufficiently broad grant of arbitral authority in the
agreement it appears that, as a practical matter, the only issue of
unconscionability that a court will address is a challenge to the very grant of
authority to the arbitrator. It seems unlikely that such a grant will be
deemed unconscionable with any frequency. This result is perfectly
consistent with the FAA and perfectly consistent with this Article’s key
argument—courts should largely be put out of the unconscionability
business when it comes to arbitration provisions.
However, the Court in Jackson should, in my view, have taken the next
logical step. Instead of leaving a fairly small scrap of unconscionability
determinations to the courts, it should have simply removed the
94. Id.
95. Id. at 2776.
96. Id. at 2778.
97. Id. at 2777.
98. Cf. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403–04 (1967)
(noting that fraud in the inducement directed at the arbitration provision at issue would be
determined under section 4).
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unconscionability doctrine completely from the judicial realm when it
comes to arbitration provisions. In the next part of the Article, I discuss
why such a result is called for by the FAA.
II. UNCONSCIONABILITY IS NOT AN APPROPRIATE TOOL FOR JUDICIAL
POLICING OF ARBITRATION PROVISIONS
This part of the Article puts forward several reasons why courts should
not use unconscionability to police arbitration provisions. First, the whole
point of the FAA is to take arbitration provisions out of the doghouse by
removing judicial discretion when it comes to their enforcement. While the
FAA was not intended to insulate arbitration provisions from all challenges,
it was intended to insulate them from the type of judicial discretion inherent
in unconscionability. This intent is made clear through the legislative
history as well as commentary contemporaneous with the passage of the
FAA. Second, that intent is made clear through the structure of the FAA,
which leaves neither a procedure nor an opportunity for judicial discretion
(except to a very limited degree after the arbitrators reach their decision).
Third, unconscionability is, in highly relevant ways, different from duress
and fraud. While duress and fraud are certainly permissible defenses to the
enforcement of an arbitration provision and likely should be addressed
under section 4, unconscionability is significantly different and should be
treated differently for purposes of the FAA.
A. Limiting Judicial Discretion
The two main rationales for unconscionability are, as discussed above,
the protection of weaker parties and the preservation of judicial integrity
(effectuated by giving courts the discretion to refuse full enforcement of
overreaching contract terms).99 The FAA has addressed both these issues
on the legislative level and removed them from the judicial realm when it
comes to arbitration provisions. The drafters of the FAA understood that
they were making a trade-off: simplicity and rigorous enforcement of
arbitration provisions took the place of judicial protection and discretion.
The rule of revocability which the FAA eliminated was itself a judicial
tool for the protection of vulnerable parties. In his testimony to the joint
congressional committee considering the legislation, Julius Henry Cohen,
general counsel for the New York State Chamber of Commerce 100 and one
of the primary drafters of both the New York Arbitration Law and the
FAA, 101 noted that “the real fundamental cause [for the rule of revocability]
was that at the time this rule was made people were not able to take care of
themselves in making contracts, and the stronger men would take advantage
99. See supra notes 54–61 and accompanying text.
100. Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and H.R.
646 Before the Subcomms. of the Comms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 13 (1924)
[hereinafter Joint Hearings] (statement of Julius Henry Cohen).
101. See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1406 n.7 (2008)
(describing Cohen and looking to his testimony before Congress to understand meaning of
the FAA); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 274, 279 (1995) (same).
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of the weaker, and the courts had to come in and protect them.” 102 Cohen
further noted that courts applying the rule of revocability “said, ‘If you let
the people sign away their rights, the powerful people will come in and take
away the rights of the weaker ones.’” 103 He continued, “And that still is
true to a certain extent.” 104
Thus, Cohen and Congress understood that there was contractual
overreaching directed against weaker parties and that courts were concerned
about this overreaching. Yet Congress still passed the FAA, presumably
determining that simplicity and the desirability of enforcing arbitration
provisions outweighed these judicial concerns. The main purpose of the
FAA was to take away from courts the judicial tool of the rule of
revocability (and presumably other similar tools) that protected vulnerable
parties. Perhaps Congress believed such tools were not necessary or that
other values outweighed judicial skittishness. Perhaps Congress was
wrong, but that is a different matter.
Congress apparently saw fit to rely on non-judicial sources to protect
weaker parties. The passage of the FAA, as well as similar statutes,
assumes a great deal of faith in the ability of the arbitrators themselves to
provide justice. The rule of revocability was premised in part on a belief on
the part of nineteenth century courts that arbitration provided “second-rate
justice at best.” 105 But the FAA was designed to reverse that judicial
hostility and ensure that arbitrators be given the power to adjudicate
disputes. 106 The FAA is designed to permit the arbitration to proceed
“without interference by the court” 107 and the FAA facilitates a “full and
fair consideration of the controversy” by the arbitrators.108 The limited
bases available for a court to vacate, modify, or correct an arbitrator’s
award 109 also demonstrate a faith in the ability of the arbitrators to do
justice.
The legislative history indicates that the FAA is premised on the belief
that to the extent arbitrators were not fully up to the task of doing justice or
protecting parties, legislation would provide sufficient additional protection.
Senator Thomas Sterling, who was chairing the joint hearings, pressed
Cohen on the issue of contractual overreaching. Senator Sterling noted,
“There are certain contracts to-day between the railroads and the shippers in
which there is an agreement to arbitrate, and the representation is made to

102. Joint Hearings, supra note 100, at 15 (statement of Julius Henry Cohen).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See Wold Architects & Eng’rs v. Strat, 713 N.W.2d 750, 761–62 (Mich. 2006)
(Corrigan, J., concurring) (discussing judicial hostility to arbitration in the nineteenth
century).
106. See discussion supra Part I.A.
107. H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 2 (1924).
108. Joint Hearings, supra note 100, at 36 (containing the brief on the proposed federal
arbitration statute).
109. See infra notes 175–87 and accompanying text.
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the shipper, ‘You can take it or leave it, just as you please; but unless you
sign you can not ship.’” 110
While Senator Sterling was focused on transactions between commercial
entities, Cohen’s answer also addressed the imposition of arbitration
provisions on individuals:
There is nothing to that contention, Mr. Chairman, for this reason: In
the first place, we have the bills of lading act, and the bills of lading act
contains the terms of the bill of lading. And that is a protection to the
shipper.
And then we have the regulation of the Federal Government, through
its regularly constituted bodies, and they protect everybody. Railroad
contracts and express contracts and insurance contracts are provided for.
You can not get a provision into an insurance contract to-day unless it is
approved by the insurance department. In other words, people are
protected to-day as never before. 111

Cohen thus had in mind that arbitration agreements would be imposed on
“regular” people, not just commercial entities. Nowhere in his answer does
Cohen indicate any role for courts in policing against overreaching
contracts, and Senator Sterling’s question seems to assume that any such
judicial protection is being removed by the FAA.
In addition to the arbitrators and the legislatures, the only other source
that Cohen mentions for the protection against improper use of arbitration
agreements is the good judgment of lawyers. In a law review article, he and
his co-author noted that “what is designed for use is subject to abuse” and
that “the arbitration clause requires skill and intelligent understanding of its
place in the scheme of contracts and of its limitations and of the safeguards
against its misuse.” 112 But nowhere is there a hint that the courts would
provide any protection.
As the Supreme Court has noted, the “preeminent concern of Congress in
passing the [FAA] was to enforce private agreements into which parties had
entered, and that concern requires that we rigorously enforce agreements to
arbitrate.” 113 Thus, rigorous enforcement and simplicity were given a
higher value than protection of weaker parties by the courts. The FAA
represents a legislative determination that courts should, regardless of what
their “consciences” tell them, enforce arbitration provisions. Arbitration
provisions are, in essence, “pre-approved” and do not have to pass the usual
judicial tests for specific enforcement (including, presumably, that the
arbitration agreement being enforced is not unconscionable).
Early commentators on arbitration legislation recognized and assumed
that the FAA and similar state arbitration statutes stripped courts of their
discretion and these commentators often criticized this aspect of the

110. Joint Hearings, supra note 100, at 15 (statement of Julius Henry Cohen).
111. Id.
112. Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA.
L. REV. 265, 281 (1926).
113. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985).
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legislation. A 1933 law review article by Professor Philip Phillips114
focused on the adoption of state statutes based on the American Arbitration
Association’s Model Arbitration Act (MAA), 115 a draft act “in complete
accord” with the FAA and designed to do for arbitration provisions in
intrastate transactions what the FAA did for arbitration provisions in
interstate transactions. 116 The MAA is, in relevant respects, virtually
identical to the FAA. 117 Phillips observed that “one concrete result” of the
adoption of statutes based on the MAA “has been the frequent insertion of
arbitration clauses in ‘take or leave it’ contracts containing provisions no
court would enforce but which arbitrators invariably do.” 118 Phillips
plainly had in mind take it or leave it contracts imposed on individuals:
Standardized order blanks used in business dealings with small buyers or
housewives frequently contain arbitration clauses, and the unsuspecting
small buyer or housewife signs the contract and is taken advantage of as a
result. The courts generally hold that the making of the contract is not in
issue and order arbitration to proceed . . . . 119

Philips criticized the arbitration laws for their stripping away of judicial
discretion in the enforcement of arbitration provisions. He observed that
the language of the MAA “leaves no ground for misunderstanding. The
court is given no discretion to deny a motion to compel arbitration, and if
the trial judge is satisfied that ‘the making of the contract . . . or the failure
to comply therewith is not in issue,’ arbitration is ordered to proceed.”120
Phillips was highly critical of this stripping away of discretion: “Is equity
history to be taken so lightly and equitable principles to be so disregarded
that specific performance, always a remedy in the discretion of the
chancellor, is now to be granted wholesale, without thought?”121
Unconscionability, it bears repeating, is itself a doctrine that had previously
been used to withhold specific performance from otherwise enforceable
agreements. 122 It, too, is presumably taken off the table by the FAA, along
with other similar doctrines.
Similarly, Professor Sidney Simpson, in a law review article published in
1934, compared American arbitration statutes (the FAA and comparable
state statutes) with the English Arbitration Act. 123 Simpson noted that
“[m]odern American arbitration statutes have been regarded as imposing

114. Philip G. Phillips, The Paradox in Arbitration Law: Compulsion as Applied to a
Voluntary Proceeding, 46 HARV. L. REV. 1258 (1933).
115. The Model Arbitration Act (MAA) is reprinted in Model Arbitration Statute Offered,
10 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y. 122, 124–26 (1926–1927).
116. Id. at 126 (containing the MAA Summary).
117. A comparison of 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, and 11, with, respectively, MAA §§ 1, 2,
3, 9, 10, and 11, shows that the text of the two acts is nearly identical.
118. Phillips, supra note 114, at 1274.
119. Id. at 1274–75.
120. Id. at 1265.
121. Id. at 1266.
122. See discussion supra Part I.B.
123. Sidney P. Simpson, Specific Enforcement of Arbitration Contracts, 83 U. PA. L. REV.
160 (1934).
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upon the courts a mandatory ‘duty to enforce’ arbitration agreements.”124
In contrast, the English Arbitration Act existing at the time gave “the court
discretion as to whether or not to stay an action brought in violation of an
arbitration clause.” 125 Simpson strongly favored the English approach in
his article, noting that the American system of compelling arbitration in
every instance even when it is “unjust in the particular case” may bring the
whole system of arbitration into “disrepute.” 126 Simpson noted that “there
can be no doubt that such cases of injustice can and do arise” as in the
inclusion in contracts of adhesion of “onerous arbitration clauses.” 127 The
American arbitration statutes, such as the FAA, were, according to
Simpson, simply not equipped to deal with such injustices since they had
effectively given pre-approval to arbitration provisions.
While early commentators assumed that the FAA was meant to remove
judicial discretion and make arbitration provisions automatically
enforceable, modern commentators have demonstrated that Congress was
right to be suspicious of courts wielding discretionary and equitable tools
when it comes to arbitration provisions. Various analyses in the past
decade of efforts by courts to apply unconscionability to arbitration
provisions suggest that a fear that judicial discretion will result in judicial
hostility is well founded. For instance, Professor Steven Burton has
observed that in many instances unconscionability is being used as part of a
new judicial hostility towards arbitration strongly reminiscent of the state of
affairs that the FAA was designed to correct. 128 Thus, Professor Burton’s
analysis of unconscionability cases led him to conclude that: “There is a
new judicial hostility to arbitration in noncommercial cases. Many courts,
when asked to enforce an arbitration agreement, seize upon the
unconscionability doctrine as a pretext to refuse enforcement.” 129
Similarly, Professor Susan Randall compared the way in which courts
apply unconscionability to similar issues in the arbitration context and in
the non-arbitration context. 130 For example, she found that while courts
generally enforce forum-selection clauses in cases that do not involve
arbitration agreements, courts routinely find forum-selection clauses in
More broadly, Professor
arbitration agreements unconscionable. 131
Randall’s study of unconscionability cases for the period of 2002 through
2003 shows that courts were almost twice as likely to find arbitration
provisions unconscionable compared to other types of contracts.132

124. Id. at 173–74 (quoting Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., 130 N.E. 288, 291
(N.Y. 1921)).
125. Id. at 174.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Burton, supra note 65, at 469–71.
129. Id. at 500.
130. Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of
Unconscionability, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 185 (2004).
131. Id. at 214–18.
132. Id. at 194–96.
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Stephen A. Broome concluded that judicial hostility towards arbitration
agreements is evident in California.133 His survey of cases from the
California intermediate courts of appeals showed that unconscionability
challenges are more than five times more likely to succeed when directed
against an arbitration provision as compared to other types of contract
provisions. 134 Further, California courts have imposed, under the guise of
unconscionability, requirements on arbitration provisions that are not
imposed on other types of contracts. For instance, under California law an
arbitration provision that is not binding on both parties is likely to be found
unconscionable. 135 Because “[o]utside of the arbitration context, California
law does not require mutuality of obligation,” 136 the requirement of
mutuality in the arbitration context represents and reflects a judicial
hostility towards arbitration.
In sum, Congress intended to remove discretionary tools from the
courts 137 (presumably leaving the fairness of arbitration provisions to
arbitrators) and, insofar as courts have wielded their discretion against
arbitration, was right to do so. This intent is also demonstrated by the
structure of the FAA, a point I turn to now.
B. The Structure of the FAA
Not only the FAA’s legislative history and contemporaneous
commentary, but also its structure, supports the proposition that the FAA
leaves no place for the type of judicial discretion that is the lifeblood of
unconscionability. Sections 3 and 4 implement the substantive rule of
section 2. 138 Through these sections the FAA provides “two parallel
devices for enforcing an arbitration agreement: a stay of litigation in any
case raising a dispute referable to arbitration [provided for in section 3] and
an affirmative order to engage in arbitration [provided for in section 4].” 139
The Court has indicated that section 3 is binding on state courts as well as
federal courts. 140 Whether state courts or only federal courts are bound by
section 4 is, according to the Court, “less clear.” 141 Regardless of whether
state courts are technically bound by both sections 3 and 4, the structure of
the FAA demonstrates what Congress had in mind for the role of the courts
in enforcing arbitration agreements.
133. Stephen A. Broome, An Unconscionable Application of the Unconscionability
Doctrine: How the California Courts Are Circumventing the Federal Arbitration Act, 3
HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 39, 65 (2006).
134. Id. at 44–48.
135. See Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 691–93 (Cal.
2000) (requiring a “modicum of bilaterality” in arbitration agreements, and asserting that
such a requirement does not run afoul of the FAA).
136. Broome, supra note 133, at 52.
137. Except for a very limited discretion in deciding whether to confirm an arbitration
judgment. See infra notes 175–87 and accompanying text.
138. See Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2776 (2010).
139. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 22 (1983).
140. See id. at 26 n.34.
141. Id. at 26. The Court noted that, unlike section 3, section 4 refers to a petition being
made in a United States district court. Id. at 26 n.35.
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As noted earlier, section 3 requires a court to stay litigation of “any issue
referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such
arbitration.” 142 Section 3 contemplates a judicial determination of whether
a disputed issue is within the scope of an arbitration agreement—the court
must be “satisfied” that it is before staying litigation. 143 Additionally, a
court must also be satisfied that an arbitration agreement was actually made,
as provided for in section 4. 144 But section 3 contains nothing that even
hints at judicial discretion. If the court finds the issue referable under an
arbitration agreement it “shall . . . stay the trial of the action until such
arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement.”145
Several courts have noted that section 3 permits no judicial discretion.
For instance, in Gutierrez v. Academy Corp., 146 the court addressed a claim
that an arbitration provision was unconscionable. The court noted that
section 3 “is mandatory; if the issues in a case are within the reach of the
agreement, the district court has no discretion to deny the stay.” 147 In
Seguros Banvenez, S.A. v. S/S Oliver Drescher, 148 the court rejected the
lower court’s relatively expansive view of the discretion granted to a court
under section 3, holding that “‘in passing upon a [section] 3 application for
a stay while the parties arbitrate, a federal court may consider only issues
relating to the making and performance of the agreement to arbitrate.’”149
Similarly, section 4 provides no place for judicial discretion. While
section 3 provides for a stay of litigation, section 4 authorizes (actually, it
requires) a court to order the parties to proceed with arbitration on the exact
terms agreed upon. Thus, under section 4 (upon a proper petition), the
court “shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the
agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue,
the court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration
in accordance with the terms of the agreement.” 150 Section 4 directs a
court how to proceed if the “making of the arbitration agreement or the
failure, neglect, or refusal to perform the same” is at issue. Unless jury trial
on these issues is waived, the court is to hold a summary jury trial on those
issues and “[i]f the jury find that an agreement for arbitration was made in
writing and that there is a default in proceeding thereunder, the court shall
142. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2006).
143. Id.
144. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967)
(holding that “in passing upon a s[ection] 3 application for a stay while the parties arbitrate,
a federal court may consider only issues relating to the making and performance of the
agreement to arbitrate,” thus indicating that the section 4 analysis is relevant to a stay
brought under section 3).
145. 9 U.S.C. § 3.
146. 967 F. Supp. 945 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
147. Id. at 947.
148. 761 F.2d 855 (2d Cir. 1985).
149. Id. at 862 (quoting Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 404); see also Schulman Inv. Co. v.
Olin Corp., 458 F. Supp. 186, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding that section 3 forecloses the
exercise of judicial discretion to consider “judicial economy and avoiding confusion and
inconsistent results” in deciding whether to grant a stay).
150. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (emphasis added).
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make an order summarily directing the parties to proceed with the
arbitration in accordance with the terms thereof.” 151 Thus, the court not
merely may, but “shall” (and the Supreme Court has added the even more
emphatic “must” 152) make an order and the order must be for the parties to
proceed with the arbitration in accordance with the terms of the arbitration
provision.
The requirement for an order to proceed with arbitration “in accordance
with the terms thereof” is telling. Unconscionability is notable in that it is a
flexible doctrine that permits a court a wide latitude in selectively enforcing
or modifying a contract. 153 That the statute requires enforcement only in
accordance with the terms of the agreement, without any possibility for
modification, indicates that unconscionability has no place in the statutory
scheme. 154 In fact, section 5 of the FAA also reflects that the terms of the
arbitration agreement are to be followed precisely and without judicial
interference: “If in the agreement provision be made for a method of
naming or appointing an arbitrator or arbitrators or an umpire, such method
shall be followed.” 155
One might respond at this point that section 4 is the exact right place for
a determination of unconscionability. Section 4 requires that the court be
satisfied that the “making” of the arbitration agreement is not at issue;
perhaps unconscionability puts the making of the arbitration agreement at
issue and should simply be addressed under section 4. Although the Court
in Jackson did not directly reach the issue (because the unconscionability of
the arbitration agreement was deemed a question for the arbitrator and not
the court), dicta in that opinion seem to indicate that a court would assess
unconscionability under sections 3 and 4. 156
There appears to be little case law that unequivocally addresses the
question. A federal district court in California recently held that an
unconscionability challenge “assumes the existence and making of the
arbitration agreement” and thus does not put the making of the arbitration
agreement at issue for purposes of section 4. 157 In contrast, a federal
district court in Kentucky recently held that the making of the arbitration
agreement had been put at issue for purposes of section 4 by allegations of

151. Id. (emphasis added).
152. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 22 n.27
(1983).
153. See U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (2002) (providing that a “court may refuse to enforce the
contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause,
or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any
unconscionable result”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981) (similar).
154. Cf. Phillips, supra note 114, at 1268 (“Generally, at least, equity can enforce its
remedies as it sees fit. But not here [i.e., under the arbitration statutes], for in ordering
arbitration it is directed to do so, ‘in accordance with the terms of the contract.’”).
155. 9 U.S.C. § 5.
156. See discussion supra Part I.C.2.
157. Madrigal v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., No. 09-CV-00033-OWW-SMS,
2009 WL 2513478, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2009).
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unconscionability and fraudulent inducement, but it is not clear if the
unconscionability claim alone would have done so.158
Professor David Horton has argued that unconscionability challenges
should be addressed under section 4.159 His position is that “the making of
the agreement to arbitrate” should be read relatively broadly and that in
order “to contest ‘the making of the agreement to arbitrate’—and thus fall
within section 4’s ambit—a party need only invoke a contract defense,”
including a claim that the arbitration provision is unconscionable. 160 For
Professor Horton, it only makes sense to view section 4 as providing a
judicial forum for claims that might be made under section 2 (i.e.,
challenges based on state laws that are not preempted by the FAA)—
“[o]therwise, Congress went out of its way to create a judicial forum for the
exceedingly rare assertion that no arbitration clause exists and yet neglected
to specify where the parties must bring the vast majority of challenges to
the validity of an arbitration clause.” 161
Despite Professor Horton’s excellent analysis, there are many reasons to
think that an unconscionability challenge directed against an arbitration
provision does not put the “making” of the arbitration agreement at issue
for purposes of section 4. First, the fact that Congress did not specify a
judicial forum for assessing unconscionability has a simple explanation:
Congress intended for arbitrators, not courts, to make such assessments.
Second, the legislative history indicates that section 4 is designed for a
comparatively narrow range of issues. Section 4 is described in the House
Report as providing a “method for the summary trial of any claim that no
arbitration agreement ever was made.” 162 An exchange between Julius
Henry Cohen and Senator Sterling sheds some additional light on section 4.
Cohen observed that the legislation addresses concerns over the
constitutional right to trial by jury through the procedure established in
section 4. 163 Cohen then testified:
But you can waive [the right to trial by jury]. And you can do that in
advance. Ah, but the question whether you waive it or not depends on
whether that is your signature to the paper, or whether you authorized that
signature, or whether the paper is a valid paper or not, whether it was
delivered properly. So there is a question there which you have not
waived the right of trial by jury on. 164

Senator Sterling followed up by stating, “The issue there is whether there is
an agreement to arbitrate or not.”165 Cohen responded, “Exactly.” 166
158. Baquie v. E. Energy Corp., No. 1:09-CV-00121-TBR, 2010 WL 1416557, at *6
(W.D. Ky. Apr. 2, 2010).
159. David Horton, The Mandatory Core of Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 96
VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 1, 3 (2010), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2010/
04/02/horton.pdf.
160. Id. at 8.
161. Id. at 7.
162. H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 2 (1924).
163. Joint Hearings, supra note 100, at 17 (statement of Julius Henry Cohen).
164. Id.
165. Id.
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A number of things are clear from this exchange. First, section 4 is about
a fairly narrow range of issues—whether an arbitration agreement really
was signed, for example. Professor Horton, however, takes a contrary
view. He points to the reference to “valid paper” as indicating that section
4 empowers courts to decide a wide range of issues beyond whether there is
an arbitration agreement.167 It is not entirely clear what Cohen meant by
“valid paper.” One law dictionary roughly contemporaneous with the
passage of the FAA defined “valid” as being “[o]f binding force. A deed,
will, or other instrument, which has received all the formalities required by
law, is said to be valid.” 168 This definition seems to point to a very narrow
meaning of the term “valid paper.” Another dictionary defined “valid”
more broadly as “[h]aving force, of binding force; legally sufficient or
efficacious; authorized by law.” 169 And a West Virginia court in 1914 also
gave a fairly broad meaning to the term “valid paper,” describing it as “such
as the law permits the parties to make and allows the courts to enforce.”170
Given the doubt about what is meant by “valid paper,” one can only fall
back on the context, and that context supports a narrow reading. The
reference to valid paper is squeezed between a statement that courts should
decide whether an agreement was signed and another statement that a court
should decide whether an agreement was properly delivered. It seems
unlikely that between these two statements, each dealing with the formal
requisites of a contract, would be a statement that courts should engage in a
broad ranging analysis of the contract. Further, Senator Sterling’s
description of the issue dealt with by section 4 as being “whether there is an
agreement to arbitrate or not” and Cohen’s affirmative response also lead to
a conclusion that the fact of agreement, and not the enforceability of the
agreement, is the focus of section 4.
In addition to the legislative history and language of the statute, there is
an additional reason why unconscionability is not to be assessed under
section 4: section 4 is directed largely at safeguarding the right to trial by
jury. 171 Section 4 provides that where the issue of the “making of the
arbitration agreement or the failure, neglect, or refusal to perform” is “in
issue, the court shall proceed summarily to the trial thereof” and that trial is
to be a jury trial unless “no jury trial be demanded.” 172
Thus, section 4 is directed at issues that are for a jury to decide; however,
unconscionability is not such an issue. Unconscionability is “addressed to
the court, and the decision is to be made by it” and evidence regarding
166. Id.
167. Horton, supra note 159, at 7.
168. HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, A LAW DICTIONARY CONTAINING DEFINITIONS OF THE
TERMS AND PHRASES OF AMERICAN AND ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE, ANCIENT AND MODERN
1196 (2d ed. 1910).
169. 2 JOHN BOUVIER, BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY AND CONCISE ENCYLOPEDIA 3387
(Francis Rawle ed., 8th ed. 1914).
170. Raleigh Cnty. Bank v. Poteet, 82 S.E. 332, 336 (W. Va. 1914).
171. See S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 8 (1924) (noting that the right to a jury trial is adequately
safeguarded by section 4).
172. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006).
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commercial practices is “for the court’s consideration, not the jury’s.” 173
Section 4 may be broad enough to include claims of fraud and duress, since
these are traditionally jury issues,174 but section 4 leaves no place for
unconscionability or other exercises of judicial discretion.
Unconscionability does not really go to the issue of whether a contract
was made. As noted earlier, in many jurisdictions the circumstances
surrounding the making of the contract are not even relevant. Further, the
key rationales of unconscionability are the protection of vulnerable parties
and the protection of judicial integrity. While these are both important
values, neither has to do with the “making” of the contract—the contract
has been made and we need to decide what to do with it.
The FAA’s structure does not completely remove all opportunity for
judicial supervision or discretion when it comes to the enforcement of
arbitration agreements. It simply postpones and cabins it by providing for
very limited judicial review after the arbitration award is entered. Section 9
of the FAA provides that after an arbitration is complete, a party to the
arbitration may apply to the appropriate court for an order confirming the
award and that the court “must” grant such an order unless there are
grounds for vacating, modifying, or correcting the award under sections 10
or 11 of the FAA. 175 Those grounds are quite narrow and provide some,
although very limited, space for an exercise of judicial discretion. As Julius
Henry Cohen observed in a brief he submitted in support of the passage of
the FAA: “The courts are bound to accept and enforce the award of the
arbitrators unless there is in it a defect so inherently vicious that, as a matter
of common morality, it ought not to be enforced.” 176 He continued, noting
that the FAA provides “no authority and no opportunity for the court, in
connection with the award, to inject its own ideas of what the award should
have been.” 177 Congress knew how to grant courts some limited authority.
It simply granted that limited authority through sections 10 and 11 and
determined that this authority is to be exercised after the arbitrators enter
their award.
Section 10 provides that an arbitration award can be vacated in the
following circumstances:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators,
or either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear

173. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 3 (2002); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 208 cmt. f (1981) (noting that “determination that a contract or term is unconscionable is
made by the court”).
174. See infra notes 189–90 and accompanying text.
175. 9 U.S.C. § 9.
176. Joint Hearings, supra note 100, at 36.
177. Id.
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evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other
misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject
matter submitted was not made. 178

The broad discretion of unconscionability is thus replaced with a much
narrower opportunity for judicial discretion.
Grounds for modification of an award are “equally limited.” 179 Section
11 permits a modification in three situations only. Two of these grounds
involve cases of ministerial mistakes, as with an evident material mistake
(either in the calculation of figures or in the “description of any person,
thing, or property referred to in the award”180) or cases where the “award is
imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the controversy.”181
The remaining ground permits a modification in cases in which the
arbitrators “awarded upon a matter not submitted to them.” 182 The broad
“justice” afforded by unconscionability is thus replaced with a much
narrower, post-arbitration opportunity for a court to modify an arbitrator’s
award “so as to effect the intent thereof and promote justice between the
parties.” 183
The Supreme Court has made clear that sections 10 and 11 represent the
sum total of judicial discretion and cannot be expanded, even by agreement
of the parties. For instance, in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel,
Inc., 184 the Court addressed an arbitration agreement that called for the
court to vacate, modify, or correct an arbitration award where either the
findings of fact were not supported by substantial evidence or the
conclusions of law were erroneous. 185 The Court held that permitting
parties to expand the “detailed categories would rub too much against the
grain of the [section] 9 language, where provision for judicial confirmation
carries no hint of flexibility.” 186
In sum, the structure and wording of the FAA make clear that judicial
application of the unconscionability doctrine has no place in the FAA and
that judicial discretion is limited to the narrow post-award review provided
for by sections 10 and 11. It is that narrow review that provides, albeit it in
178. 9 U.S.C. § 10.
179. Cohen & Dayton, supra note 112, at 273.
180. 9 U.S.C. § 11(a).
181. Id. § 11(c).
182. Id. § 11(b).
183. Id. § 11.
184. 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008).
185. Id. at 1405.
186. Id. The Court expressed doubt as to whether the “manifest disregard of the law”
(language the Court had used in an earlier opinion) could serve as a ground for vacating an
award. The Court suggested it was possible that the language had simply been intended to
refer to some or all of the section 10 grounds collectively. Id. at 1404. The Court recently
passed on an opportunity to definitively state whether the “manifest disregard” standard
survived Hall Street as an independent ground for review or as a judicial gloss on the
grounds set forth in section 10. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct.
1758, 1768 n.3 (2010).
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a more limited way, the judicial “safety valve” function that the
unconscionability doctrine is said to provide. 187
None of this is to say that arbitrators may not assess the fairness or
unconscionability of arbitration provisions. The mandatory language of the
FAA is not directed towards arbitrators but rather to courts. And judicial
hostility is the evil to be corrected by the FAA.
Thus, while
unconscionability remains “the law,” that law is to be applied by arbitrators
and not the courts.
C. Fraud, Duress, and Unconscionability: The “Making of the Contract”
Versus “What the Contract Is Made Of”
As previously noted, the Court has twice grouped unconscionability with
fraud and duress as “generally applicable contract defenses” that are
permitted under section 2.188 The Court may well be correct, but it does not
follow that all three defenses are to be addressed by courts under section 4.
While fraud and duress do fit, albeit uncomfortably, within section 4 (and
hence may be addressed by courts), unconscionability does not.
Unconscionability differs from fraud and duress in important and
relevant ways. First, the contract defense of fraud is a question of fact,189
as is the contract defense of duress. 190 Accordingly, they are appropriately
decided by the summary jury trial called for in section 4. Conversely,
unconscionability is a question of law for a court 191 and therefore is by
definition outside the scope of such jury trial.
Second, fraud and duress are “all or nothing defenses,” while
unconscionability is anything but. The result of a successful claim of
duress is either that no contract was formed (in the case of physical
duress) 192 or that the contract is voidable in its entirety (in the case of
economic duress). 193 Similarly, the result of a successful claim of fraud is
either that no contract was formed (in the case of fraud in the execution)194
or that the contract is voidable in its entirety (in the case of other types of
187. See, e.g., Steinhardt v. Rudolph, 422 So. 2d 884, 890 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)
(noting that unconscionability serves as a “safety valve” to enable courts to administer
justice). See generally Amy J. Schmitz, Embracing Unconscionability’s Safety Net Function,
58 ALA. L. REV. 73 (2006) (arguing that unconscionability’s function as a safety valve to
prevent contractual overreaching should be protected against trend towards formalism in the
law).
188. See discussion supra Part I.C.2.
189. See, e.g., Chamberlain Livestock Auction, Inc. v. Penner, 462 N.W.2d 479, 481
(S.D. 1990) (noting that the existence of fraud as a contract defense is a question of fact).
190. See, e.g., Premier Farm Credit, PCA v. W-Cattle, LLC, 155 P.3d 504, 521 (Colo.
App. 2006) (noting that duress is generally a question of fact); Alexander v. Standard Oil
Co., 368 N.E.2d 1010, 1016 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (same); Gainey v. Gainey, 675 S.E.2d 792,
799 (S.C. Ct. App. 2009) (same). But see Comcast of Oregon II, Inc. v. City of Eugene, 155
P.3d 99, 106 (Or. Ct. App. 2007) (noting that the underlying facts of a defense of fraud,
including whether the party claiming duress acted reasonably, is for the jury, but question of
whether particular facts amount to duress is a question of law).
191. See supra notes 45–47, 68–70 and accompanying text.
192. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 174 (1982).
193. Id. § 175.
194. Id. § 163.
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fraud and misrepresentation). 195 As a result, these defenses fit nicely into
the FAA’s enforcement scheme—if the defense of fraud or duress fails then
the arbitration agreement is enforced “according to the terms” of the
agreement, and if the defense succeeds, then the agreement is not enforced
at all.
Unconscionability, however, is quite different. It is not an “all or
nothing” defense. Instead, the court is given a great deal of discretion in
deciding how to proceed and has choices other than non-enforcement or full
enforcement. Under the U.C.C., for example, a court is specifically given
discretion to refuse to enforce a contract, but may also “strike any single
clause or group of clauses . . . or it may simply limit unconscionable clauses
so as to avoid unconscionable results.” 196 The common law provides this
same discretion, 197 and, indeed, even the earliest unconscionability cases
were premised on the idea that a court could partially enforce a contract if
necessary for justice. 198 Since the FAA is premised on courts applying all
or nothing defenses only—enforcement on the terms of the agreement or
not at all—there is a place in sections 3 and 4 for fraud and duress. There is
no such place for unconscionability.
Third, fraud and duress both put at issue the making of the contract in a
way that a claim of unconscionability does not. As noted above, certain
forms of fraud and duress go directly to the making of the contract. Fraud
in the execution and physical duress result in there being no contract at all,
and thus plainly put the making of the contract at issue. Other types of
fraud and duress do not so directly put the making of the contract at issue,
but they do result in a contract that is voidable at the election of the victim
and in that sense go to whether the parties “really” made a mutually binding
contract. 199 While unconscionability, at least in most jurisdictions, requires
some analysis of the bargaining process, in all jurisdictions the substance of
the terms is relevant. 200 Unlike unconscionability, duress and fraud do not
generally depend on the substance of the contract or contract terms at issue.
To establish a claim of fraud in the inducement requires showing that a
“party’s manifestation of assent is induced by either a fraudulent or a
material misrepresentation by the other party upon which the recipient is

195. Id. § 164.
196. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt.2 (2002).
197. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (noting that court has the ability to
refuse enforcement of the contract, enforce the contract without the unconscionable clause,
or limit the application of any unconscionable clause).
198. In what is considered one of the earliest cases on unconscionability, James v.
Morgan, (1663) 83 Eng. Rep. 323 (K.B.), the court addressed the enforcement of a contract,
the full enforcement of which would have resulted in the payment of an exorbitant price for a
horse. The court opted for limited enforcement, restricting the jury to an award of only a
purchase price equal to the value of the horse. Id.
199. Cf. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403–04 (1967)
(stating in dicta that a claim of fraud in the inducement directed against an arbitration
provision goes to the making of the agreement to arbitrate and should be decided under
section 4).
200. See discussion supra Part I.B.
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justified in relying, the contract is voidable by the recipient.”201 The
contents and substance of the contract itself are irrelevant; only the process
by which the contract was made is relevant. Similarly, a claim of nonphysical duress is made out and a contract is deemed voidable “[i]f a party’s
manifestation of assent is induced by an improper threat . . . that leaves the
victim no reasonable alternative.”202 The threat and the reasonableness of
alternatives are relevant, but the substance of the contract is not. This
means, in theory, that a finder of fact could assess these defenses without
knowing the substance of the contract and only the circumstances of the
making of the contract. This makes for reasonably good fit under section 4
and reduces the danger of judicial “discrimination” against arbitration
provisions since the substance of the contract is not legally relevant. This is
not at all true of unconscionability, in which the substance of the contract is
a key and required consideration. Thus, while fraud and duress go to the
making of the contract (and hence belong in section 4), unconscionability
goes to the very different question of what the contract is made of.
Finally, unconscionability is a rule of judicial discretion. If a contract is
unconscionable a court “may” refuse to enforce it, in whole or in part.203
But fraud and duress are not discretionary. If the elements of physical
duress or fraud in the execution are established then the result is
automatic—there is no contract.204 Similarly, non-physical duress and
fraud in the inducement also leave nothing to judicial discretion—if the
elements are satisfied then the contract becomes voidable.205 Unlike
unconscionability, duress and fraud are (relatively) cabined and constrained
doctrines and not doctrines of judicial discretion. They are thus far less
susceptible to being used as proxies for judicial hostility towards arbitration
provisions.
In sum, fraud and duress may be an uncomfortable fit with the FAA’s
judicial enforcement scheme, but they do fit. Unconscionability is quite
different from those two doctrines—it is not a jury question, it is not an all
or nothing defense, it does not go to the making of the contract, and it is
largely a discretionary doctrine. Unconscionability may fit within section
2, but it does not fit within sections 3 and 4.
Therefore, the
unconscionability of arbitration provisions should not be a question for the
courts.
III. ARBITRATORS AS ARBITERS OF GOOD ARBITRATION?
In light of the conclusions set forth above, we are left with one final
question: in a world in which courts cannot use unconscionability to assess
arbitration provisions, are the arbitrators themselves up to the task of
policing arbitration agreements? There is at least some reason to think the
answer to this question is “yes.”
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164(1).
Id. § 175(1).
U.C.C. § 2-302 (2002); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 174 (duress); id. § 163 (fraud).
See id. § 175(1) (duress); id. § 164(1) (fraud).
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First, we should remember that we are all pretty new to this. The
widespread proliferation of arbitration provisions into consumer and
employment contracts is a relatively recent phenomenon, as is the practice
of drafting one-sided arbitration provisions. 206
Under the current system, we leave it to arbitrators to assess
unconscionability challenges to both the entire contract (including the
arbitration provision) and each of the terms of a contract other than the
arbitration provision itself (such as purchase price). Only if a challenge is
to the arbitration provision itself can the court assess the claim. 207 There is
some irony in trusting arbitrators to assess the fairness of all provisions in a
contract except for the one type of provision they see most frequently and
address on a regular basis.
The Supreme Court in Jackson determined that arbitrators are capable of
making determinations about the unconscionability of an arbitration
agreement. The Court made clear that parties can allocate the question of
unconscionability of the arbitration agreement itself to the arbitrators. The
only issue that appears not subject to allocation is the very question of
whether the allocation itself is unconscionable.208
Individual
arbitrators
have
found
arbitration
provisions
unconscionable, 209 so at least we know the phenomenon is not merely an
urban myth. On a macro level, some of the large providers of arbitration
have indeed responded to certain perceived abuses in the arbitration system.
For instance, JAMS, a large provider of private arbitration services,210 has
had a “Policy on Consumer Arbitrations Pursuant to Pre-Dispute Clauses”
in effect since July 2009 that articulates “Minimum Standards on
Procedural Fairness.” 211 According to this policy, JAMS will administer a
consumer arbitration only if the clause itself and the rules of arbitration
called for by the clause meet certain minimum requirements. These
minimum standards include requirements that the arbitration agreement be
binding on both parties, 212 that all remedies that would be available to a
consumer in litigation be available in arbitration, 213 that the arbitrators be
neutral (and that the consumer have some reasonable opportunity to
participate in the selection process), 214 that the consumer have a right to an
206. See supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text.
207. See discussion supra Part I.C.2.
208. See discussion supra Part I.C.2.
209. See, e.g., Labor Ready Nw., Inc. v. Crawford, No. 07-1060-HA, 2008 WL 1840749,
at *2–4 (D. Or. Apr. 21, 2008) (noting that arbitrator had struck down arbitration provision
that prohibited class actions); Smith v. Gateway, Inc., No. 03-01-00589-CV, 2002 WL
1728615, at *1–2 (Tex. Ct. App. July 26, 2002) (noting that arbitrator had found
unconscionable an arbitration provision prohibiting consequential, indirect, or punitive
damages).
210. See infra note 225.
211. JAMS Policy on Consumer Arbitrations Pursuant to Pre-Dispute Clauses: Minimum
Standards of Procedural Fairness, JAMS:
THE RESOLUTION EXPERTS,
http://www.jamsadr.com/consumer-arbitration (last visited Mar. 23, 2011).
212. Id. ¶ 1.
213. Id. ¶ 3.
214. Id. ¶ 4.
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arbitration in the consumer’s “hometown area,” 215 that costs be limited to
$250, 216 that discovery be allowed, 217 and that the arbitrators’ award states
finding and conclusions in writing. 218 The JAMS policy responds well to
many objections directed towards arbitration provisions.
Similarly, the American Arbitration Association (AAA) established a
National Consumer Disputes Advisory Committee designed to develop
“standards and procedures for the equitable resolution of consumer
disputes.” 219 The committee articulated fifteen principles in the form of a
Consumer Due Process Protocol. The first principle in the protocol is that
“[a]ll parties are entitled to a fundamentally-fair ADR process.”220
Accordingly, other principles call for “a Neutral who is independent and
impartial,” 221 to an arbitration “of reasonable cost to [c]onsumers,”222 and
to an arbitration at a “location which is reasonably convenient to both
parties.” 223 Although the Consumer Due Process Protocol does not itself
set any rules, the recommendations are “likely to have a direct impact on
the development of rules, procedures and policies for the resolution of
consumer disputes under the auspices of the AAA.” 224
Of course, the promulgation of guidelines by arbitration associations is
not a complete cure. First, even the noblest aspirations are not always fully
realized. Second, it is difficult to monitor whether an organization is in fact
consistently applying its own standards. Third, there is probably little
recourse if such an organization ignores its standards. And, of course, not
every provider of alternative dispute resolutions has adopted standards like
those of JAMS and the AAA (though these organizations are arguably the
most significant providers of such services).225 But the fact that two
leading providers of arbitration services have taken it on themselves to
articulate minimum standards of fairness is encouraging.
Although it may seem odd to provide an arbitrator with a power that a
court is lacking, it is not at all inconsistent with the FAA. First, the FAA is
designed to correct the hostility that courts directed towards arbitration
provisions. The FAA, as previously discussed, was designed to undo rules
by which courts refused to specifically enforce arbitration provisions and by
215. Id. ¶ 5.
216. Id. ¶ 7.
217. Id. ¶ 9.
218. Id. ¶ 10.
219. Consumer
Due
Process
Protocol,
AM.
ARBITRATION
ASS’N,
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22019 (last visited Mar. 1, 2011) (Introduction: Genesis of
the Advisory Committee).
220. Id. (Principle 1).
221. Id. (Principle 3).
222. Id. (Principle 6).
223. Id. (Principle 7).
224. Id. (Introduction: Genesis of the Advisory Committee).
225. JAMS describes itself as “the largest private alternative dispute resolution . . .
provider in the world.” About JAMS, JAMS:
THE RESOLUTION EXPERTS,
http://www.jamsadr.com/aboutus_overview/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2011). The American
Arbitration Association describes itself as the “nation’s largest full-service alternative
dispute resolution . . . provider.” Dispute Resolution Services, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N,
http://www.adr.org/drs (last visited Mar. 1, 2011).
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which courts permitted one party to back out of an arbitration agreement.226
That is, it was designed “to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to
arbitration agreements that had existed at the English common law and had
been adopted by American courts.” 227 The FAA has nothing to do with the
power of an arbitrator to make an assessment of the grant of its own
authority or whether the rules provided for in an arbitration agreement
satisfy the arbitrator’s own standards. 228 Second, the “mandatory” aspects
of the FAA are not directed against arbitrators. Thus, a court, upon
determining that there is no issue regarding the making of the arbitration
agreement or its scope, “shall make an order summarily directing the parties
to proceed with the arbitration in accordance with the terms thereof.” 229 It
is the “court” that must issue the order and the court’s order is directed to
the parties. Nowhere is the behavior of the arbitrator subject to control, nor
could it be.
I am not suggesting that the problem of overreaching arbitration
provisions has been completely solved by the arbitrators. But I am
suggesting that they may be moving in the right direction and should be
given an opportunity to address the problem.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that courts applying the unconscionability
doctrine to arbitration provisions are not acting in a manner consistent with
the FAA. Congress took the judicial exercise of unconscionability off the
table with the passage of the FAA and did so with good reason.
Accordingly, even courts that consider arbitration provisions to be
misbehaving “little monsters” must grit their teeth and treat such provisions
like the “little darlings” Congress says they are. The arbitral system should
be given a chance to demonstrate that it can deal with the problem of
overreaching arbitration provisions in a manner that is both effective and
consistent with the FAA.

226. See discussion supra Part I.A.
227. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (emphasis added).
228. Cf. Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 939 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting that
senior vice president of the AAA had testified that system of “arbitration” established by an
employer “so deviated from minimum due process standards that the [AAA] would refuse to
arbitrate under those rules”).
229. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006).

